Charles de Gaulle was born in Lille on November 22, 1890, into a Catholic and patriotic family. His father, Henri de Gaulle, was a professor of literature and history. The young Charles studied with the Jesuits and decided at the early age of 15 to pursue a military career. Raised to revere national greatness, Charles de Gaulle chose to become an officer in the army.

Bourgeois, Catholic, and nationalist: this is how Charles de Gaulle’s youth can be described. He was already dreaming of a national destiny: in an essay written in 1905, the schoolboy imagined that in 1930 France would be attacked and saved by a certain… General de Gaulle. As a young officer, Charles de Gaulle joined an army that he tended to idealize.

Ranked 119th out of 221 when he entered the Saint Cyr Military Academy in 1909, he graduated in 1912, ranking 13th. He joined the 33rd Infantry Regiment in Arras as a second lieutenant, where he served for some time under Colonel Pétain, who would become his mentor. He was promoted to lieutenant on October 1, 1913.

More on General de Gaulle: Walk to Les Invalides to visit the army museum and de Gaulle collections.

Charles de Gaulle’s First World War

Between 1914 and 1915, he was wounded three times before being taken prisoner on March 2, 1916. On March 1, 1916, when his company was almost entirely wiped out by a German attack, the now Captain de Gaulle was presumed dead. General Pétain, who commanded the Verdun stronghold, even signed a posthumous citation. In reality, de Gaulle had survived: he had been stunned by a grenade and wounded by a bayonet. The reason he could not be found was that he had fallen into enemy hands. He remained a prisoner of war in Germany until the end of the conflict. He spent the last part of his imprisonment in the citadel for “hard cases” in Ingolstadt, Bavaria. He tried to escape five times, without success. He was therefore only released at the armistice on November 11, 1918.

Anecdotes
It was there that he met the Tsarist lieutenant Tukhachevsky, also a prisoner, who would later become a marshal in the USSR and head of the western front during the Russian-Polish War of 1920. In this capacity, they would become adversaries, with de Gaulle then serving as an advisor to the Polish army. Marshal Tukhachevsky was shot on Stalin’s orders in 1937, a few months after meeting de Gaulle again in Paris. In 1966, during his visit to Moscow as President of the Republic, he tried in vain to meet with the Marshal’s sister, who was still alive. During this visit, de Gaulle withdrew for 20 minutes alone in the crypt of Stalin’s tomb (not Lenin’s) on Red Square, to the great astonishment of the Soviet officials accompanying him. What thoughts might he have shared with this dictator?

Towards a disagreement with Pétain

Released after November 11, 1918, Charles de Gaulle continued his military career under Pétain’s protection. But this period of captivity was crucial to Charles de Gaulle’s intellectual development. It allowed him to reflect on the implementation of “total war,” mobilizing the entire economy and society as the conflict dragged on after the failure of the major offensives of 1914, on the mistakes of the French high command, and on the relationship between civilian power and the army. These years of captivity in Germany, which kept him away from the fighting and victory, remained a deep wound for de Gaulle, as he wrote to his mother at the time of his release:

“The immense joy I feel with you at these events is mixed, it is true for me, with a more bitter than ever, indescribable regret at not having played a greater part in them. […] Not having been able to take part in this victory, arms in hand, is for me a sorrow that will only die with me.”

In early April 1919, he was seconded to the Polish Autonomous Army. He served three tours of duty in Poland and even took part in the Soviet-Polish War. After Poland’s victory, he wrote a general report on the Polish army. While analyzing the actions of the sole FT 17 tank regiment, he wrote, “Tanks must be deployed together and not scattered,” but it was in Poland that de Gaulle discovered mobile warfare. He emphasized the use of large cavalry units as a shock force and a means of achieving strategic decisions. It was these observations that gradually distanced him from the doctrine of the French military hierarchy, whose leaders—including Marshal Pétain—had mainly experienced the static trench warfare of the Great War.

The Charles de Gaulle – Maréchal Pétain crisis

In 1922, de Gaulle passed the entrance exam for the École supérieure de guerre, an essential step in advancing his career. He then joined Pétain’s personal staff in 1925. The marshal greatly favored Charles de Gaulle’s career, even allowing him to teach the classes he was responsible for at the École de guerre in his place. While the “victor of Verdun” was at the height of his glory, he decided to prepare a book on the history of the French soldier and entrusted its writing to his young protégé, whose writing talents he had spotted with the publication, in 1924, of “La Discorde chez l’ennemi” (Discord Among the Enemy).

It should also be added that Lieutenant Colonel de Gaulle lost his respect for Pétain when Marshal Lyautey was dismissed in July and August 1925. Pétain withdrew his staff from Lyautey, who had done so much for France in Morocco, and told him “that his time was over and that he would soon be replaced by a civilian resident.”

But a more serious crisis erupted between the two men in 1928. De Gaulle took great offense at Pétain’s decision to call on a second author, Colonel Audet, to help his book project move forward more quickly. The quasi-filial relationship he had enjoyed with the marshal was broken.

Finally, upon his return from Lebanon in 1932, de Gaulle published a compilation of his lectures on the role of command in Le Fil de l’épée (The Thread of the Sword). He emphasized the importance of training leaders and the weight of circumstances. While de Gaulle studied the importance of static defense to the point of writing: “The fortification of its territory is a permanent necessity for France […]” he was nonetheless sensitive to the ideas of General Jean-Baptiste Eugène Estienne on the need for an armored corps, combining firepower and mobility, capable of bold initiatives and offensives. On this point, he increasingly found himself at odds with official doctrine, particularly that of Pétain.

Ten years later, de Gaulle published the manuscript originally written for Pétain under his own name and under the title “La France et son armée” (France and its Army). Offended, the marshal tried to prevent its release, before authorizing its publication with the dedication: “To the Marshal, who kindly helped me with his advice.” “ De Gaulle corrected it at the last minute, replacing it with the phrase: ”To Monsieur le Maréchal, who wanted this book to be written.” This phrase was, in a way, the final nail in the coffin, because although Pétain had wanted the book to be written, it was in fact for his own glory and under his own name.

Pétain now seems to consider the colonel to be nothing more than an ambitious man lacking in education. This marks a definitive rift between the two men, who will only meet briefly again in June 1940.

Charles de Gaulle in Lebanon – 1929-1932

After leaving his position working for Pétain, de Gaulle was transferred to Lebanon in 1929, a territory under French mandate since 1919. This was his only experience in a colonized territory, lasting three years.
This career choice may have been motivated by his desire to distance himself from Pétain and France with his family, due to the illness of his young daughter Anne, born a year earlier. Although we now know that Down syndrome is caused by a genetic abnormality, society at the time perceived it as a shameful disease caused by hereditary defects. The discovery of “poor little Anne’s” disability was inevitably a difficult experience for the de Gaulles, who nevertheless chose to keep their daughter with them rather than place her in a specialized institution. In 1940, during a rare confession about his daughter, de Gaulle explained to his regiment’s chaplain, Canon Bourgeon, who reported his words:

“For a father, believe me, it is a very great ordeal. But for me, this child is also a blessing. She is my joy. She helps me to overcome all failures and honors, to always see higher.” Charles de Gaulle.

The Pre-War Period and Charles de Gaulle – 1932-1940 – New Ideas for a Modern Army

While pursuing his military career, Charles de Gaulle strove to spread his ideas. His first book, published in 1924, La Discorde chez l’ennemi (Discord Among the Enemy), remained little known. In it, de Gaulle analyzed the reasons for Germany’s defeat, emphasizing the disastrous consequences of the abdication of civilian power in favor of military power—was this a premonition or an analysis of what would happen in France in 1939?

Charles de Gaulle returned to mainland France in 1932 when he was appointed to the Superior Council of National Defense. As new tensions developed on the European continent, raising the possibility of a new conflict, he was in a prime position to observe the debates surrounding events.

In publishing a collection of his lectures on the role of leadership in 1932, in Le Fil de l’épée (The Thread of the Sword), he recalled the importance of training leaders and the weight of circumstances. Le Fil de l’épée focuses on the importance of the role of the leader, who must not be bound by dogma and must always be able to show initiative and critical thinking—the opposite of the French Army marshals of the time?

But it was his third book, Vers l’armée de métier (Towards a Professional Army), published in 1934, that was the most successful, quickly being translated into Russian and German. In it, de Gaulle developed the idea that the advent of the tank had revolutionized warfare, offering a way out of the stalemate that had characterized the last conflict due to the superiority of artillery over infantry. However, he considered that conscripts were not suited to serving in armored units, which required specialized and trained personnel. De Gaulle called for the establishment of a professional army alongside the conscript army.

The Phoney War of 1939

When World War II broke out on September 1, 1939, de Gaulle was a colonel commanding the tanks of the Fifth Army stationed in Alsace.

He was frustrated during the “Phoney War” (which lasted until May 10, 1940) as the Allied strategy favored a wait-and-see approach over the offensive. However, the collapse of Poland in just a few weeks in the face of the Wehrmacht, which employed the Blitzkrieg (“lightning war”) strategy in which aircraft and tanks played the leading role in breaking through the front lines and destroying enemy defenses, seemed to confirm de Gaulle’s theories about the new role of armored vehicles in modern warfare.

When the Germans launched their offensive towards the west on May 10, 1940, de Gaulle had just been given command of the 4th Reserve Armored Division (DCR), which he deployed twice in an attempt to launch a counteroffensive, on May 17 at Montcornet and on May 19 at Crécy-sur-Serre. Although his tanks managed to temporarily push back the enemy, his initiatives ultimately ended in failure, as the division commanded by de Gaulle did not have enough infantry to hold the positions it had conquered, nor the necessary resources to deal with the air raids by German Stukas. Although he was not victorious, Charles de Gaulle received congratulations from the high command and was promoted to brigadier general, becoming the youngest general in the French army.

Until the age of 49, when World War II broke out, Charles de Gaulle had enjoyed a brilliant military career, deeply marked by his combat experience during World War I and abroad. Between the wars, he developed ideas in favor of a new army, better suited to modern warfare, those of a patriotic and visionary military man.

Charles de Gaulle at the heart of events in May-June 1940

As the military situation continued to deteriorate, his mentor Paul Reynaud, who succeeded Daladier as head of government in March 1940, appointed him Under-Secretary of State for Defense on June 5. It was on this date, at the age of 50, that de Gaulle began his political career.
While Commander-in-Chief Weygand, supported by Marshal Pétain, was in favor of an armistice with Germany, de Gaulle campaigned for the fighting to continue. He was in favor of establishing a Breton redoubt, which consisted of regrouping the French army and government in Brittany to temporarily halt the German advance and allow the executive branch to be transferred to the Empire in order to continue the fight.

On June 9, he met with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the United Kingdom. On June 11, 1940, the penultimate meeting of the Supreme Allied Committee took place at the Château du Muguet in the commune of Breteau, near the commune of Briare, with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his Secretary of War Anthony Eden in attendance. They landed that same day near Briare with three generals and, on the French side, Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, Vice-Prime Minister Philippe Pétain, the new Secretary of State for War Charles de Gaulle, Maxime Weygand, and various other officers. This meeting, known as the “Conference of Briare,” marked a split between the Allies, but also among French leaders between those who wanted to continue the war (de Gaulle) and those who favored an armistice (Pétain, Weygand).

Pétain vs. de Gaulle: a fundamental and definitive disagreement over France’s future vis-à-vis Germany

At the Briare conference on June 11, 1940, Pétain’s position of choosing collaboration to save what remained of France was in complete disagreement with that of de Gaulle. The German blitzkrieg in Spring 1940 shattered French defenses in weeks. By June 14, the Nazis occupied Paris. France’s government, headed by Marshal Philippe Pétain—a World War I hero—signed an armistice on June 22, essentially surrendering. Pétain formed the Vichy regime in the unoccupied South, collaborating with the Nazis and declaring: “France has lost.” For many, this surrender was unbearable and not everyone agreed to give up.

While the Vichy regime suppressed dissent and enforced Nazi policies, de Gaulle—broadcasting from exile—organized resistance, mobilized French colonies, and sought Allied support. He became the symbol of a Free France, showing that the fight was far from over.

As a result, one month after Winston Churchill launched Operation Catapult with the attack on the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir in Algeria (July 3-6), de Gaulle was tried twice in absentia and charged with “treason, undermining the external security of the state, desertion abroad during wartime in a territory under a state of war and siege” and sentenced in Clermont-Ferrand on August 2, 1940. He was sentenced to “death, military degradation, and confiscation of his movable and immovable property.” His deprivation of French nationality was confirmed in a decree dated December 8, 1940.

Charles de Gaulle and the British

On June 17, 1940, de Gaulle found refuge in London. In Great Britain, he had the support of Winston Churchill, but also that of Parliament, the press, and public opinion, grateful to the gallant Frenchman for having stood by their country at the worst moment of the German threat. This support, like that of American public opinion, would later prove to be a valuable asset during tensions with London and Washington. But this did not prevent numerous disagreements from erupting between Churchill and de Gaulle until 1945.

The British retreat from Dunkirk

First, between May 26 and June 2, 1940, Britain decided, without consulting the French command, to withdraw its army by evacuating its entire expeditionary force of 200,000 men—as well as 139,229 French soldiers—from Dunkirk. Contrary to his promises, Churchill refused to allow the 25 fighter squadrons of the Royal Air Force to intervene. He left the rest of the French army alone to face the Germans, who captured all their equipment (2,472 guns, nearly 85,000 vehicles, 68,000 tons of ammunition, 147,000 tons of fuel, and 377,000 tons of supplies) and took the remaining 35,000 French soldiers prisoner.

A disagreement over the meaning of de Gaulle’s struggle

Despite the relationship of trust sealed by treaties between Churchill and de Gaulle, the two men sometimes had tense (stormy) relations. In September 1942, Churchill said to de Gaulle: “But you are not France! You are Fighting France. We have put all this in writing.“ De Gaulle immediately replied: ”I am acting on behalf of France. I am fighting alongside England, but not on behalf of England. I speak on behalf of France and I am accountable to France.”

Operation in Syria

They were on the verge of breaking up in 1941 over Syria, an operation that lasted from June to July 1941. It was intended to prevent the Germans from threatening the Suez Canal following the attempted coup on April 1, 1941, in Iraq by Rashid Ali al-Gillani, the pro-German Prime Minister of Iraq.

Operation Torsch, to which de Gaulle was not invited

“Operation Torch” is the code name given to the Allied landings on November 8, 1942, in North Africa, mainly in Morocco and Algeria. It followed the operation that took place from October 23 to November 3, 1942, near El Alamein (Egypt), which pitted the British 8th Army led by Bernard Montgomery against Erwin Rommel’s Deutsches Afrikakorps. It resulted in a decisive Allied victory.

The aim of Operation Torch was to open a front in North Africa against the Germans and to carry out a “smooth” landing with the help of the local Resistance, without fighting, in the hope that the Vichy French troops on the ground would rally to the Allies.

Following months of negotiations between local Resistance leaders and British and, above all, American representatives, it was decided that:

• During the Allied landing, key figures and strategic points in North Africa would need to be neutralized for several hours to allow the Allies to carry out their intervention without disruption. It was hoped that once the landing was complete, Pétain’s African army would join the Allies and enter the war alongside them.
• The landing would take place without the intervention of de Gaulle’s Free French forces, as General de Gaulle’s participation in the operation would only have further antagonized the Vichy generals. Another factor was President Roosevelt’s lack of sympathy for de Gaulle, due, among other things, to the liberation of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon by Admiral Muselier’s Free French Naval Forces (FNFL) on December 24, 1941, without the consent of the United States. As for Robert Murphy, he continued to believe that it was possible to win over the Vichy regime to the Allied cause, despite their statements and concrete acts of collaboration in North Africa itself (where German-Italian armistice commissions were closely monitoring the French authorities).

According to Éric Branca, de Gaulle was not informed of this landing on “French sovereign territory,” which he interpreted as an attempt to sideline his organization. This was particularly true given that, following the landing, the United States installed Admiral Darlan, “Marshal Pétain’s former heir apparent, who claimed to govern on his behalf,” as head of the AFN. He was assassinated by the local resistance on December 24, 1942.

The landing in Madagascar without warning de Gaulle

The British landed in Madagascar without warning the Gaullists, which was a special case: after the Vichy government surrendered in November 1942, the British administered the island for several months and did not hand over control to Free France until January 1943.

The situation of France’s African possessions, which was being played out politically in French North Africa (AFN), gradually stabilized with the merger of the authorities in Brazzaville (Free France) and Algiers (French Civil and Military High Command) within the French Committee of National Liberation in June 1943.

Charles de Gaulle and Roosevelt

Relations with Franklin Delano Roosevelt were even more problematic. The American president, who was personally fond of France, was disappointed by France’s collapse in 1940 and became disillusioned with De Gaulle after the failure of his campaign at Dakar (late September 1940).

According to Duroselle, Roosevelt’s systematic anti-De Gaulle policy, known as the “third man” tactic, which aimed to oust the leader of Free France in favor of the Vichy regime, left a lasting impression on the man of June 18, who saw it as a sneaky maneuver by American imperialism.

French lobbyists in Washington and the lack of reliable information from Roosevelt’s advisors

There were many French anti-Gaullists in Washington, as virtually all of them came from the Vichy government. For example, the former secretary general of the Quai d’Orsay, Alexis Léger (Saint-John Perse), described the general as an “apprentice dictator.” The president was also very poorly informed about the situation in France by the American ambassador, Admiral Leahy, who remained in Vichy until May 1942. He therefore had no confidence in de Gaulle. A note from de Gaulle to Churchill partly explains the French attitude towards America: “I am too poor to bow down.”

Roosevelt’s hatred of de Gaulle

Roosevelt’s hatred was so intense (he considered de Gaulle at worst a future tyrant, at best an opportunist) that even his deputies eventually took offense, including Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who ultimately sided with Free France and its leader.

The gradual recognition of de Gaulle’s leadership, much to the chagrin of the American government

The governments in exile in England, which were considered “legal,” had been content with good neighborly relations with the Gaullists, who were regarded as dissidents from the “legitimate” government of Pétain, which was also based in London under conditions recognized as legal. This situation was slowly changing in De Gaulle’s favor when, in 1943, the Belgian government in exile led by Hubert Pierlot and Paul-Henri Spaak precipitated the movement. It was the first to officially recognize the “Free French” and De Gaulle as the only legitimate representatives of France. The British government (Anthony Eden, a close associate of Churchill) had tried to dissuade the Belgians, fearing that their initiative would serve as a model for other governments in exile. The Americans themselves intervened, believing they could use Belgian-American trade relations to put pressure on the Belgians (particularly with regard to their uranium orders from the Belgian Congo). Nothing worked. Despite British and American pressure, Spaak officially announced that Belgium now considered the Pétain government to be illegitimate and that the Free French Committee, later the Provisional Government of France, was the only body legally authorized to represent France.

The Saint Pierre and Miquelon crisis (December 24, 1941)

This was another moment of heightened tension between Free France and the US government. According to historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, the Allies feared that the French archipelago, under Vichy authority, would become a radio base benefiting German submarines. General de Gaulle therefore proposed to the Allies that his Free French naval forces occupy the island. The Americans refused, and de Gaulle then ordered Muselier to seize the island with or without the support of the Allies, which led the Canadians and Americans to plan to invade the island without anyone’s approval. Furious upon hearing the news, de Gaulle ordered Muselier with great insistence to seize the island as quickly as possible, with or without the agreement of the Allies.

De Gaulle’s insubordination to American orders was seen by Secretary of State Cordell Hull as a serious affront and a challenge to the authority of the United States. Hull publicly referred to the French volunteers who carried out this action as “so-called Free French.” This expression was strongly criticized by the American public, which was sympathetic to the actions of the French resistance. Hull concluded from this affair that “de Gaulle was a kind of dangerous adventurer, an apprentice dictator.”

General Giraud’s preference for de Gaulle to represent France to the Allies

It took nothing less than an acceptable general on the French side to take charge of the return to war alongside the Allies. After the assassination of Admiral Darland, Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil put forward the name of General Giraud, who had escaped from Germany and whom he had served as aide-de-camp in 1940. However, he did not inform the other members of the Resistance that Giraud was also an admirer of Pétain and the National Revolution regime. He thus obtained their agreement without difficulty.

Giraud also had the favor of the Americans, who preferred him to de Gaulle, whose judgment and methods were considered unreliable and less maneuverable by Roosevelt. Giraud, contacted by an American envoy and by Lemaigre-Dubreuil, agreed to participate in the operation, but initially demanded that it take place simultaneously in France and that he personally exercise command-in-chief—nothing less! In the meantime, he appointed General Charles Mast, chief of staff of the Algerian army corps, to represent him to the conspirators and made it known that he could rally the North African army to the Americans, which the French resistance groups doubted.

De Gaulle succeeded in gaining a foothold in Algiers in May 1943. The French National Committee merged with the French Civil and Military High Command led by Giraud to form the French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN), with Giraud and de Gaulle as co-presidents. But within a few months, de Gaulle marginalized Giraud within the CFLN, before ousting him in November with the formation of a new government and asserting himself as the sole political leader of the French Allied forces. The Free French Forces merged with the African Army under Giraud’s command: the French Liberation Army, composed of 1,300,000 soldiers, took part in the fighting alongside the Allies. On June 3, 1944, in Algiers, the CFLN became the Provisional Government of the French Republic (GPRF).

The Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) project

The antagonism between Roosevelt and de Gaulle reached its peak on the eve of the Normandy landings. The tensions were due to the Allied plan to establish an Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT) in France. According to historian Régine Torrent, this controversial body consisted of “the military occupation of France by British and American generals” who would maintain and use the Vichy administration while reserving “the top positions in the national administration […] for the British or American commander-in-chief.” General de Gaulle, who in 1944 was president of the GPRF, considered AMGOT to be an extremely serious attack on French sovereignty. A veritable “second occupation,” “an attempt to subjugate France by means of a military administration,” materialized in the form of a franc printed in the United States, “counterfeit currency” “symbolic of the attacks on French sovereignty,” which was to be legal tender in liberated France.

Roosevelt placed France in the camp of the defeated.

Roosevelt planned to make France a weak state, and the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) project went very far in this direction, treating France as a defeated nation rather than one of the victorious powers. It was an attempt by the Americans to take advantage of France’s collapse to seize the French colonial empire for their own benefit: “the American government proposed to place French colonies under an international trusteeship regime, to begin with”; a status that would give the United States free access to markets and resources in addition to strategic points. This, of course, was unacceptable to a free-thinking, staunchly French mind such as de Gaulle’s.

The dispute between de Gaulle and the United States

For Charles de Gaulle, the Normandy landings on June 6, 1944, were an “Anglo-American” affair from which the French were deliberately excluded. This is what he told his minister Alain Pierrefitte in 1964 to explain his non-participation as President of the French Republic in the 20th anniversary of the Normandy landings.

Finally, de Gaulle strove, no doubt in part to “force the Anglo-Saxons to bend,” to maintain the closest possible ties with the USSR, notably by wanting to send French regiments to fight on the Eastern Front, which Churchill and Roosevelt prevented with all their might. According to Jean-Luc Barré, de Gaulle even asked Bogomolov if, in the event of a break with the Anglo-Saxons, it would be possible to move the Free French headquarters to Moscow.

For historian Bruno Bourliaguet, “Charles de Gaulle’s attitude towards the United States after 1945 can only be understood by considering the conflictual relations he had with President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Second World War.

Charles de Gaulle in politics until 1958

Restoration of democracy in France and disagreement between the Constituent Assembly and de Gaulle

During this immediate post-war period, he effectively exercised a role equivalent to that of head of state.

On July 12, 1945, de Gaulle announced to the French people that a double consultation would be held. The first part involved electing an Assembly, and the second part involved determining whether it would be constituent, which would imply the abandonment of the Third Republic. His plan was accepted, as 96% of the French people voted in favor of a Constituent Assembly.

But then, de Gaulle, President of the Provisional Government, disagreed with the Constituent Assembly on the conception of the state and the role of political parties. He resigned over the issue of military funding to the President of the National Assembly, Félix Gouin, on January 20, 1946. He had fulfilled the mission he had set himself on June 18, 1940: to liberate the territory, restore the Republic, organize free and democratic elections, and undertake economic and social modernization.

The founding speech in Bayeux on June 16, 1946

On April 8, 1946, he received a letter from Edmond Michelet, proposing that he “regularize his situation in the Army” and informing him that Félix Gouin, President of the National Assembly, wished to elevate him to the rank of Marshal of France. Charles de Gaulle refused, saying that it was impossible to “regularize a situation that was absolutely unprecedented.”

On June 16, 1946, de Gaulle outlined his vision for the political organization of a strong democratic state in Bayeux, Normandy, in a speech that remains famous to this day, but he was not followed. He then began his famous “crossing of the desert” until 1958, when he returned to power.

General de Gaulle’s “crossing of the desert”

In 1947, he founded a political movement, the Rassemblement du peuple français (RPF), which rallied resistance fighters, prominent figures, and even former Pétainists. This party enjoyed successes but also suffered setbacks, as it was opposed by the “Third Force,” which was the French government coalition in power under the Fourth Republic, comprising the French Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO), the Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance (UDSR), the Radicals, the Popular Republican Movement (MRP), and the moderates (Republican and Liberal right), to support the regime against opposition from the French Communist Party and the Gaullists. In short, it was a party system, which de Gaulle feared at the time of his Bayeux speech, where the politicians of the day changed governments and took turns sharing seats in the ministries. There were 24 governments between 1947 and 1958, the longest lasting 18 months and the shortest only three weeks. It should be noted that de Gaulle’s long-time arch-enemy, Mr. Mitterrand, served as minister 11 times under the Fourth Republic! Hence his opposition to de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic, which he nevertheless adopted and used without restriction and without second thoughts when he was able to get himself elected president.

Throughout this period, de Gaulle remained largely removed from active political life, but in complete disagreement with what he observed—and what he had predicted.

The return in 1958 against the parties in power under the Fourth Republic

Ministerial instability and the Fourth Republic’s impotence in the face of the Algerian question, triggered by an uprising on November 1, 1954, led the regime into a serious crisis. Politicians from all sides came to wish for the General’s return.

As in the events of the Second World War, it was his former comrades in the Resistance who brought him to power; all of them continued to admire the architect of the Liberation. The Gaullist movement was well structured, thanks in particular to the support of the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF), and several of its members were placed in strategic positions. Jacques Chaban-Delmas (resistance fighter), Minister of National Defense in 1957, sent Léon Delbecque (resistance fighter) to Algiers where, as vice-president of the Comité de salut public (CSP), he advised General Salan, who publicly called on de Gaulle to return to power. The retired General de Gaulle had not asked them to do anything.

De Gaulle officially took center stage with the intention of implementing the reforms he had sought during his first presidency and outlined in Bayeux in 1946. To calm tensions, he held a press conference on May 19, 1958, which served, among other things, to reassure the public about the special period he was demanding in order to restore order. His response to fears of dictatorship left a lasting impression: “Have I ever infringed on fundamental civil liberties? I restored them. And have I ever infringed on them again? Why would I want to start a career as a dictator at the age of 67?”

The appeal of President René Coty

On May 29, the then President of the Republic, René Coty, appealed to the “most illustrious of Frenchmen.” Charles de Gaulle agreed to form a government. Under pressure, the National Assembly invested him on June 1, by 329 votes out of 553 voters. General de Gaulle thus became the last President of the Council of the Fourth Republic. The deputies granted him the power to govern by decree for a period of six months and authorized him to carry out the country’s constitutional reform.

The new Constitution, drafted during the summer of 1958, was very similar to the proposals he had outlined in his second speech in Bayeux, with a strong executive. However, General de Gaulle agreed to give Parliament more power than he would have liked. In particular, de Gaulle had to give up the idea of electing the President of the Republic by universal suffrage, a central element of his constitutional plan, which he would eventually impose in 1962. The Constitution was adopted by referendum on September 28, 1958, with 79.2% voting “yes.” Charles de Gaulle was elected President of the Republic on December 21 and took office on January 8.

Charles de Gaulle President of the French Republic – 1958-1969

Charles de Gaulle’s honesty
When he was President of the Republic and invited his family to lunch at the Élysée Palace, the cost of these “non-professional” meals was deducted from his presidential allowance. He applied these principles of rigor and honesty throughout his public life. So much so that no “scandal” ever tarnished his public or private life—and yet it was not for lack of opponents who would have liked to and sought to reveal “juicy” stories about him. He must certainly be the only one in this category of incorruptibles!

De Gaulle on the international stage

On the international stage, rejecting the domination of both the United States and the USSR, he defended an independent France with nuclear strike capability (first tests in 1960). He also laid the foundations for the French space program by creating the National Center for Space Studies on December 19, 1961. As a founding member of the European Economic Community (EEC), he vetoed the United Kingdom’s entry.

The end of the Algerian War and the OAS and Armed Opposition

With regard to the Algerian War, de Gaulle initially raised high hopes among the French in Algeria, to whom he declared in Algiers on June 4, 1958: “I understand you.” On that day, he refrained from making any specific promises.

In the summer of 1959, Operation Jumelles, known as the Challe Plan, dealt the FLN its heaviest blows throughout the country. De Gaulle quickly realized that it would not be possible to resolve the conflict through military victory alone, and in the fall of 1959, he began to move toward a solution that would inevitably lead to Algerian independence. He explained to Alain Peyrefitte as early as 1959 that the “integration” of Algeria into France, advocated by supporters of French Algeria, was a utopian dream: two countries so culturally distant and with such a wide gap in living standards were not destined to form a single nation.

The push in Algiers and the war against the OAS

With the conscript army, he defeated the generals’ coup in Algiers in April 1961. It took only four days to rout the “quarteron of retired generals” stigmatized in one of his most famous speeches. This attitude provoked strong resistance from certain nationalist groups, and de Gaulle was forced to suppress uprisings by pieds-noirs in Algeria.

He became the target of terrorist organizations such as the Secret Armed Organization (OAS), which nicknamed him “la Grande Zohra.” The metropolis then became the target of several waves of attacks by the OAS.

A few months later, during a banned demonstration on February 8, 1962, eight demonstrators were killed by police forces at the Charonne metro station and another died later in hospital.

As for the OAS terrorist organization, it was suppressed by ruthless means: summary executions, torture, and parallel police forces, which did not hesitate to recruit gangsters such as Georges Boucheseiche and Jean Augé. The State Security Court was created in January 1963 to convict the leaders, who were granted amnesty a few years later.

The Evian Accords with the algerian FLN

In 1962, following the Evian Accords, a ceasefire was declared in Algeria. General de Gaulle held a referendum on Algerian independence, which came into effect in July 1962.

The day after the Evian Accords were signed, the French army’s auxiliaries, the Harkis, were disarmed by France and abandoned on the spot—and massacred by the FLN.

In April 1962, Prime Minister Michel Debré is replaced by Georges Pompidou, and in September of the same year, de Gaulle proposes amending the Constitution to allow the president to be elected by direct universal suffrage, with the aim of strengthening his legitimacy to govern directly.

Petit-Clamart assassination attempt

A 35-year-old weapons engineer and graduate of the École Polytechnique named Jean Bastien-Thiry considered General de Gaulle’s policy on Algeria to be one of abandonment and betrayal. With the help of like-minded individuals belonging to the Secret Armed Organization (OAS), he therefore planned to kidnap de Gaulle or, if that proved impossible, to assassinate him. An attack was thus organized at the Petit-Clamart roundabout (in the Paris suburbs) on August 22, 1962. It failed, although the presidential car later showed, among the impacts (about 150 bullets fired), a bullet mark that had passed a few centimeters from the faces of the presidential couple.

In his statement at the opening of his trial in January 1963, Bastien-Thiry explained the motives behind the plot, which were based mainly on General de Gaulle’s policy on Algeria. He was sentenced to death on March 4, 1963. Because he had fired at a car occupied by a woman and because, unlike the other members of the commando, he had not taken any direct risks, Bastien-Thiry was not pardoned by General de Gaulle, unlike the other members of the commando (and the other members of the OAS who had been caught). A week after the end of his trial, Bastien-Thiry was shot at Fort d’Ivry (near Paris).

In 1968, an initial amnesty allowed the last remaining leaders of the OAS, hundreds of supporters of French Algeria who were still in detention, and others in exile, such as Georges Bidault and Jacques Soustelle, to return to France. Former activists of French Algeria then rallied to Gaullism, joining the SAC or the Committees for the Defense of the Republic (CDR). De Gaulle told Jacques Foccart on June 17, 1968: “We must move towards a certain reconciliation.” The other criminal convictions were expunged by the amnesty laws of 1974 and 1987.

The 1965 presidential election and François Mitterrand

In the first round, de Gaulle came out on top with 44.65% of the vote, ahead of the united left candidate, François Mitterrand (31.72%), and Jean Lecanuet (15.57%). When Interior Minister Roger Frey suggested that de Gaulle publish photos of François Mitterrand alongside Philippe Pétain during the Occupation, the outgoing president refused to use such methods. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing did the same as General de Gaulle during the 1981 presidential election—and Giscard d’Estaing was defeated. Charles de Gaulle was re-elected President of the Republic on December 19, 1965, with 55.20% of the votes cast. The General later told a few close associates that he would not serve out his term (due to end in 1972) and would retire at the age of 80.

Charles de Gaulle, international politics, and Europe

The “Algerian burden” considerably reduced France’s room for maneuver and overshadowed foreign affairs. The policy of “national independence” was then fully implemented with the end of the Algerian War.

On the international stage, de Gaulle continued to promote France’s independence: he twice refused (in 1963 and 1967) to allow the United Kingdom to join the EEC. But in 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, de Gaulle supported US President John F. Kennedy.

However, in 1964, de Gaulle condemned the military aid provided by the United States to the Republic of Vietnam (known as South Vietnam) against the communist rebellion led by the Viet Cong (a guerrilla group supported by North Vietnam), as well as Israel’s response to Egypt’s blockade of the Strait of Tiran, and went even further by establishing a military blockade on Israel during the Six-Day War in 1967. He made one of his most spectacular decisions in 1966 by withdrawing France from NATO’s integrated military command and expelling American bases from his territory.

Europe and de Gaulle

With regard to Europe, de Gaulle was in favor of a “Europe of nations” and states, which alone could answer for the nations, with the latter retaining their full sovereignty and their historical and cultural identity within Europe. “If you want nations to unite, don’t try to integrate them as you would integrate chestnuts into chestnut purée. You must bring their legitimate leaders together to consult with each other and, one day, to form a confederation, that is, to pool certain powers while remaining independent in all other respects.” De Gaulle was therefore openly hostile to the idea of a supranational Europe, as advocated by Jean Monnet.

For de Gaulle, as for Churchill, the United Kingdom had simply done its duty in 1940, and France owed London no “debt” in relation to World War II. De Gaulle disapproved of the privileged relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States since the war, as well as the imperial economic preference that existed between the latter and the Commonwealth states, making it difficult for the United Kingdom to be admitted into Europe. He therefore considered the entry of such an “American Trojan horse” into Europe to be undesirable. The British therefore waited until 1973 before joining the European Economic Community (EEC).

De Gaulle and communism

De Gaulle’s position on the communist world was unambiguous: he was totally anti-communist. He advocated normalizing relations with these regimes, which he considered “transitional” in the eyes of history, in order to play a pivotal role between the two blocs. The recognition of the People’s Republic of China on January 27, 1964, was a step in this direction. Similarly, his official visit to the People’s Republic of Poland (September 6-11, 1967) was a gesture that showed that the French president considered the Polish people to be historically rooted. The German question, and therefore the demarcation of Poland’s western border, played a major role in the official discussions. Despite the domination exercised by the USSR, de Gaulle was spontaneously welcomed by enthusiastic crowds. As he told the Polish Sejm (National Assembly), he was banking on a future in which Poland would regain its place as an independent state. Once again, this was part of his plan for an enlarged continental Europe.

Anecdote:
For more than twenty years, from London, the general worked with Maurice Dejean, a French diplomat and staunch advocate of friendship with Russia. Dejean was ambassador to Moscow in 1963. The Soviet secret services used to employ a system known as “swallows.” These women were tasked with trapping Western diplomats and agents stationed in the USSR using a method long proven in the world of espionage: they would seduce the target, then a supposed spouse would arrive unexpectedly and threaten to cause a scandal if the unwary target did not comply. Alain Peyrefitte (C’était de Gaulle, p. 690) provides cautious information. On January 14, 1964, de Gaulle confided in him: “Another lamentable story. Poor Dejean [Peyrefitte writes ”X…”] found a way to get himself caught. The Soviets got him into the clutches of a woman. A little more, and our telegram collections would have ended up in the Kremlin”. According to one of De Gaulle’s aides, whose words Peyrefitte reports too, Dejean, recalled to Paris, asked for an audience to justify himself, “but the General received him for only a few seconds: ‘So, Dejean, we like women, don’t we?’. And he dismissed him without shaking his hand.”

President de Gaulle and the United States

Relations between de Gaulle and the United States were undoubtedly the most complex. Despite some serious tensions, de Gaulle always stood by them during times of real crisis, notably the Berlin Blockade and the Cuban Missile Crisis. On the other hand, when it was the Americans who stirred up tensions, de Gaulle publicly distanced himself, notably in his speech on September 1, 1966, in Phnom Penh, in which he vilified the American attitude in Vietnam, a theater of operations with which France was very familiar.

The reverse was also true: even his private communications were spied on by the United States, but also by the United Kingdom, which monitored him even at his home! Needless to say, the General did not appreciate this at all!

Nuclear weapons and opposition from the French and Americans

Convinced of the strategic importance of nuclear weapons, de Gaulle continued to develop them, conducting nuclear tests in the Sahara and then in French Polynesia, despite protests from the opposition (Mitterrand), who saw them as nothing more than “little bombs.” De Gaulle retorted: “In ten years, we will have enough to kill 80 million Russians. Well, I don’t think anyone would willingly attack people who have enough to kill 80 million Russians, even if they themselves had enough to kill 800 million French people, assuming there were 800 million French people.”

The United States’ attitude towards this program was ambivalent. Kennedy offered to give de Gaulle Polaris missiles, as he had done with the United Kingdom (Nassau agreements). But de Gaulle refused, stating that he wanted France to build its own army. The nuclear issue poisoned Franco-American relations throughout the 1960s. It was not until Richard Nixon that the first clearly “Gaullist” American president came along. Nixon first circumvented restrictive American nuclear legislation before officially opening the way for Franco-American nuclear collaboration. By then, the French program was already largely complete and its nuclear weapons highly effective.

France’s opposition to the United States and Great Britain and France’s withdrawal from NATO

As historian Olivier Pottier explains, NATO practiced a system of integration, whereby the contingents of different countries were placed under American command. As a result, a significant portion of the French army was directly under foreign command. In contrast to this system, de Gaulle was in favor of forming a “combined allied staff” or “tripartite directorate” in which the main members of the Alliance—France, Great Britain, and the United States—would establish the Alliance’s strategic direction in cooperation. He proposed reforming NATO along these lines in a memorandum dated September 12, 1958, which was unanimously rejected by the Americans and British. This Anglo-American refusal confirmed to de Gaulle the hegemonic nature of US defense policy.

After withdrawing the French fleet from NATO command in the Mediterranean (1959), then in the Atlantic and the English Channel, de Gaulle wrote to US President Lyndon Johnson on March 7, 1966, to notify him of France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command: “France intends to recover full sovereignty over its territory, currently undermined by the permanent presence of allied military forces and the habitual use of its airspace, to cease its participation in integrated commands, and to no longer make forces available to NATO.” While remaining a partner in the Atlantic Alliance, de Gaulle’s France thus withdrew from “the military organization integrated under American command,” as de Gaulle confided to Peyrefitte. American troops stationed in France had to evacuate their bases, and NATO headquarters left Rocquencourt (near Versailles) to move to Belgium.

Conversion of US dollars into gold

Aware of the danger that the hegemony of the dollar posed to the international monetary system and the global economy in general, and believing that it “led Americans to go into debt, and to go into debt gratuitously to foreign countries, because what they owed them, they paid […] with dollars that only they could issue ,” de Gaulle was in favor of a return to the gold standard.

On the recommendation of economist Jacques Rueff, who saw the space race and the Vietnam War as destabilizing the US balance of payments, de Gaulle demanded that the US provide gold in exchange for a large proportion of the dollars held by France. The operation was legal, as the dollar was then officially defined as corresponding to 1/35 of an ounce of gold. Under international regulations, the United States had to comply, and de Gaulle had the French Navy repatriate the Bank of France’s gold deposits in New York from the Federal Reserve Bank. In 1971, the United States ended the gold standard to allow the dollar to “float.” Following the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, gold prices skyrocketed: Jacques Rueff’s advice was indeed wise in the long term.

Political crisis of 1968

In addition to the financial reforms of 1958, France benefited from the “Trente Glorieuses” (the thirty glorious years) and the growth that began under the Fourth Republic. Economic structures were modernized and living standards rose. But growth did not benefit everyone equally, and a certain disenchantment arose in the face of social stagnation.

According to his own supporters, de Gaulle was completely taken by surprise by a crisis he did not foresee and did not understand. Indifferent to the students’ demands and the “crisis of civilization” they revealed, he saw it at best as a huge disturbance by young people who did not want to take their exams, and at worst as a challenge to the authority of the state that had to be stopped immediately.

De Gaulle’s sense of humor
Behind this austere facade sometimes lay a subtle sense of humor—deadpan, discreet, but very real.
One of the most delightful anecdotes dates back to 1967, during an arts and literature dinner organized at the Élysée Palace by André Malraux, then Minister of Culture.
Among the evening’s guests was Brigitte Bardot, icon of French cinema, who made a striking entrance dressed in a daring hussar cavalry costume.
De Gaulle, impassive, observed the scene for a moment before leaning discreetly toward Malraux and whispering:
“Chic! A soldier!”
A short, ironic, and perfectly elegant reply, typical of De Gaulle.
In one sentence, he combined humor, wit, and self-mockery, while maintaining the majestic distance that characterized him.

After the night of barricades from May 10 to May 11, 1968, a skeptical de Gaulle nevertheless allowed his Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, who had just returned from a trip to Iran and Afghanistan, to pursue a new policy of appeasement. Pompidou, who had had to threaten to resign, now wanted to avoid clashes and was betting that the movement would eventually run out of steam.

From May 14 to 18, de Gaulle was traveling in Romania. Upon his early return from Romania on the evening of the 18th, de Gaulle disappointed even his most loyal supporters by appearing overwhelmed and indecisive, lacking his usual liveliness and quick reactions. He seemed torn between Pompidou’s caution and the firmness he himself preached.

The strikes continue. On the 27th, a demonstration at Charléty Stadium launches the idea of a provisional government. That same day, François Mitterrand takes up this solution and announces his candidacy for the presidency of the Republic. The political crisis reaches its peak.

The sudden and unexplained disappearance of the head of state, who left with his wife by helicopter on May 29 for an unknown destination, causes astonishment and gives rise to all kinds of speculation. He goes to Baden-Baden in Germany, where he is received by General Massu, in charge of the French contingent in Germany. Upon his return to Paris the next day, his radio address was firm in tone. He announced the dissolution of the National Assembly. This was followed by a huge demonstration organized by Gaullists on the Champs-Élysées.

De Gaulle announced it on May 30, 1968, in a radio address, like the appeal of June 18 or the intervention of 1960 during the barricades of Algiers. The sentences were short, each one or almost each one announcing a decision. The end of the speech refers to a previous statement, without quoting it, about “the ambition and hatred of politicians who have been cast aside” and asserts that, after being used, “these figures would weigh no more than their own weight, which would not be heavy.” But the General overlooks the 44.5% of votes cast for Mitterrand in the second round of the 1965 presidential election, or even his majority in the 1967 legislative elections.

The Gaullists’ victory in the legislative elections, although massive, did not sufficiently revitalize the government. The National Assembly, which was more right-wing, was also more cautious about the reforms desired by General de Gaulle (participation, regionalization, university reform, etc.). The ousting of the real winner of the crisis, Pompidou, was poorly understood, and the latter now appeared to be a potential successor. De Gaulle was no longer irreplaceable.

1969 referendum and resignation

The referendum was finally set for April 27, 1969, and focused on regionalization and Senate reform. It provided for the transfer of powers to the regions, the introduction of representatives of professional and trade union organizations into regional councils and, a point particularly criticized by the opposition (especially Senate President Gaston Monnerville, who was directly targeted), the merger of the Senate with the Economic and Social Council. De Gaulle announced that he would resign if the “no” vote won.

On April 27, although the “yes” vote had been predicted to win just a few days earlier, the “no” vote prevailed with 52.41% of the votes cast. A few minutes after midnight on April 28, a terse statement was issued from Colombey-les-Deux-Églises: “I am stepping down as President of the Republic. This decision takes effect today at noon.” The President of the Senate, centrist Alain Poher, who had replaced Gaston Monnerville at the head of the Senate, took over as interim president as provided for in the constitution.

Why did Charles de Gaulle often disagree with others and have so many opponents?

As a child, de Gaulle showed exceptional intelligence and an ability and willingness to make his own decisions, in a family where morality and honesty had to remain beyond reproach. And despite a military background based on obedience rather than dissent, he retained a critical and constructive mind throughout his life, with a cult of excellence and France.

Then, at a very young age, he had the opportunity to meet and interact with well-known figures (Pétain and the generals of World War I), which allowed him to learn from them, but also to see their limitations and the mistakes they had made. This led him to understand that his choices and reasoning abilities were well worth those of his mentors.

During the turbulent interwar period, and especially at the beginning of World War II, he found himself thrust into the international arena and the Anglo-Saxon world with its intrigues and dirty tricks. Although he was little known abroad and considered insignificant, he managed to thwart these intrigues and ultimately gain recognition as the sole representative of France.

As a statesman, he became a leading figure in international politics, with decisions for France—and the world—based on a vision of the future that still influences minds and shapes the realities of today’s global organization.

In the end, despite all the opposition and disagreements it provoked, Charles de Gaulle stands in Paris and in France as a central figure whose legacy is woven into the country’s fabric. From the bustling Charles de Gaulle Airport to the grand Place Charles de Gaulle crowned by the Arc de Triomphe, his name is everywhere. His life is not just a chapter in French history—it’s the story of resilience, leadership, and unwavering faith in France, even in its darkest times.

Death and funeral of Charles de Gaulle

On November 9, 1970, as usual, the General began playing a game of solitaire in the library of his home in La Boisserie (General de Gaulle’s personal residence in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises in Haute-Marne, halfway between Paris and Strasbourg). He complained of back pain before collapsing at 7:02 p.m., the victim of a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm, and died about twenty minutes later, before his doctor, Dr. Lacheny, could arrive.

News of De Gaulle’s death quickly spread around the world. It was an opportunity to reflect on the role he had played in the history of France, as well as in the history of Europe and the world.

The General’s funeral was held on November 12, 1970, in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, attended by 50,000 people and a delegation from the French armed forces, the only official participation authorized by the General in his will. In Paris, many foreign heads of state gathered to honor his memory at Notre Dame, with 70,000 people watching the ceremony from the square in front of the cathedral. 300 million television viewers watched the ceremonies on worldwide television broadcasts.

“I want my funeral to take place in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises. If I die elsewhere, my body must be transported home without any public ceremony.

My grave will be the one where my daughter Anne already rests and where, one day, my wife will rest. Inscription: Charles de Gaulle (1890-…). Nothing else… No speeches are to be made, either in church or elsewhere. No funeral oration in Parliament. No seats are to be reserved during the ceremony, except for my family, my fellow members of the Order of Liberation, and the municipal council of Colombey. …I hereby declare that I refuse in advance any distinction, promotion, dignity, citation, or decoration, whether French or foreign. If any such honor were to be bestowed upon me, it would be in violation of my last wishes.”

— Testament of Charles de Gaulle, January 16, 1952

The Charles de Gaulle Memorial has been open in Colombey-les-deux-églises since 1980 and can be visited all year round. Click here for opening hours.

In Paris book Les Invalides to visit the army museum and de Gaulle collections.